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     1 Introduction
Incomplete contract theory has addressed the issue of how to design the optimal contractual
arrangement to achieve the e¢ cient investments in the presence of contract incompleteness (Gross-
man and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1990, Hart 1995). In this theory, incompleteness comes from
the parties inability to write complete contingent contract on all future states of nature and ex
ante investments because they are too costly to describe (Dye 1985, Anderlini and Felli 1994
2001, Battigalli and Maggi 2002 2008) or unveri￿able by court (Hart and Moore 1988, Anderlini
et al. 2007). After the relevant state of nature is realized, the parties may renegotiate the initial
contract. However, such ex post renegotiation may lead to ine¢ cient investments. This is called
under-investment result or the ￿ hold-up problem￿(Klein et al. 1978, Williamson 1985, Grossman
and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1988).
In the contract solution literature (Rogerson 1992, MacLeod and Malcomson 1993, Aghion et al.
1994, N￿ldeke and Schmidt 1995, Fares 2006), the hold-up problem can be solved by de￿ning a
renegotiation framework so that gains from renegotiation are never shared (renegotiation design).
Aghion et al. (1994) show that such a renegotiation framework can be designed in a speci￿c
performance contract. Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) argue however that an e¢ cient solution can
be implemented with a speci￿c performance contract without renegotiation design if a separability
condition is satis￿ed, i.e. if the e⁄ect of investments and the e⁄ect of the state of the world enter
the parties valuation functions in an additively separable manner.
This note shows that this separability condition generates the same solution than if the valuation
functions are independent of the state of nature (proposition 1). This implies that a simple menu
of prices that does not specify the level of trade can solve the hold-up problem (proposition 2).
That is, specifying the terms of trade by writing a speci￿c performance contract is useless with
the separability condition. Therefore, we argue that a speci￿c performance contract has some
value to overcome the hold-up problem only with a renegotiation design.
The remaining sections are organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3
analyzes the equivalence result between the separability condition and the no (direct) uncertainty
assumption.
2 The Model
A seller (she) and a buyer (he) engage in a long-term relationship. They write a contract which
speci￿es the delivery, at a precise date in the future, of a given quantity q 2 R+ of the good
produced by the seller, and the payment of a predetermined sum of money p 2 R. The production
cost and the bene￿t to the parties are a⁄ected both by the realization of a random variable ! 2 ￿
(distributed according to a known function F(!)). The cost of the seller is also a⁄ected by
her investment ￿ 2 [0;1) and the bene￿t of the buyer by his investment ￿ 2 [0;1). These
investments are made before the value of ! is realized. They are relationship-speci￿c, i.e. the
parties cannot recoup the cost of the investment if they leave the speci￿ed relationship.
Let c(q;!;￿) denote the seller￿ s production cost of delivering q units of output when ! and ￿ are
1the arguments of the cost function. Similarly, let v(q;!;￿) be the buyer￿ s (gross) bene￿t of receiv-
ing q units of the good when the realized state of the world is !, and when his level of investment
is ￿. It is assumed that both v(q;!;￿) and c(q;!;￿) are increasing in q and v(q;!;￿)￿c(q;!;￿)
is (strictly) increasing in (￿;￿) at a (strictly) decreasing rate. The economically interesting case
is one where incentives to invest are sensitive to expected levels of trade: vq￿ ￿ 0 and cq￿ ￿ 0.
Assume also that higher ! increases (decreases) marginal bene￿t (production cost) from invest-
ment, i.e. v￿! > 0 (c￿! < 0): We next assume that for every !;￿;￿: v(0;!;￿) = c(0;!;￿) = 0,
i.e. the bene￿t and the cost of having no trade are both equal to zero. This assumption formalizes
the idea that the cost of a speci￿c investment cannot be recouped in the absence of trade.
Following the incomplete contract literature, we assume that !;￿; and ￿ as well as v and c are all
observable by the two parties, but are nonveri￿able by court. Therefore it is impossible to write
a contract conditional upon any of them: the contract can only specify an allocation (e q; e p); where
e q is the level of output to be delivered by the seller and e p the payment to be made by the buyer.
Moreover, the court can impose this initial contract if either of the two parties demands it. In
legal terms, the court uses the speci￿c performance remedy with a possibility of renegotiation.
Indeed, the court is assumed to be able to enforce the initial contract unless the parties voluntarily
agree to replace this by another contract.
The sequence of events proceeds as follows. At date 0, the parties commit to a simple contract
(e q; e p). At date 1, the parties decide simultaneously upon their respective investment levels. At
date 2, seller and buyer learn their types after observing the state of nature. Trading the output
and agreeing on the transfer payment, or perhaps breach of the contract, occurs at date 3, after
which any outstanding claims are settled or go to court. At the stage between date 2 and 3, ex
post renegotiation may occur if both parties agree to do so.
2.1 The benchmark
The ￿rst best, as a benchmark, is the outcome achieved when ￿;￿;! are all observable by the
two parties but also veri￿able and hence contractible1. If both parties are risk neutral, given a
realized value of ! and chosen levels of investment (￿;￿), their preferences are described by the
following utility function uB = v(q;!;￿) ￿ p and uS = p ￿ c(q;!;￿). The social surplus is then
de￿ned as
￿(q;!;￿;￿) ￿ uB + uS = v(q;!;￿) ￿ c(q;!;￿)
For any given (￿;￿), let
fq
￿(!;￿;￿); p
￿(!;￿;￿) : ! 2 ￿g





1The benchmark cannot be interpreted as the solution under vertical integration. Indeed, in the incomplete con-
tract theory (more precisely in the property rights approach) integration does not make the information veri￿able
(Hart 1995).
2The e¢ cient investments (￿







￿(!;￿;￿);!;￿;￿)dF(!) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1)
The e¢ cient investments maximize the di⁄erence between the total expected gain and the direct
cost of investments. If both ￿ and ￿ were veri￿able, it would be possible to contract over
investment levels and thus the parties would choose (￿
￿;￿￿) which maximizes the expected net
gains from the relationship. Indeed, an optimum contract would stipulate that between dates 0
and 1 the buyer and the seller must undertake ￿
￿ and ￿￿ respectively; if a party failed to invest
at the speci￿ed level, then he would be made to pay a large penalty to the other.
3 Characterization result
When ￿;￿;! are unveri￿able and hence uncontractible, parties can write only an incomplete
(contingent) initial contract (e q; e p). We assume that the renegotiation of (e q; e p) between dates 2 and
3 results in an e¢ cient quantity of trade q￿(!;￿;￿) and that both parties appropriate the entire
net surplus (i.e. budget balancing). This net surplus, denoted S ￿ [￿(q￿(:);!;￿;￿)￿￿(e q;!;￿;￿)],
is the di⁄erence between the joint surplus ￿(q￿(:);!;￿;￿) that would result from renegotiation
and the joint surplus under the original contract terms, i.e. ￿(e q;!;￿;￿) ￿ (v(e q;!;￿)￿c(e q;!;￿)).
The bargaining positions of the parties are supposed to be exogenously determined and we simply
assume that the parties share the surplus from bargaining, with the seller receiving a fraction
￿ 2 [0;1]: Unlike renegotiation, we do not model the negotiations that result in the initial contract.
Rather we simply assume that these negotiations yield an e¢ cient contract. This can be modeled
as the buyer choosing a contract (e q; e p) subject to the constraint that the seller achieves, in
expectation, a reservation utility. As a normalization of utility, we set this reservation level of
utility to zero. Given the initial contract and the subsequent renegotiation, the seller￿ s expected
payo⁄ from choosing ￿ at date 1 is
US(￿;￿; e q) =
Z
[e p ￿ c(e q;!;￿)] + ￿S dF(!) ￿ ￿
=
Z
[e p ￿ c(e q;!;￿)] + ￿[￿(q
￿(:);!;￿;￿) ￿ ￿(e q;!;￿;￿)]dF(!) ￿ ￿ (2)
where the ￿rst term in the integral [e p ￿ c(e q;!;￿)] represents the seller￿ s status quo under the initial
contract. The next term represents the seller￿ s share of the net surplus arising from renegotiation.
Similarly, the buyer￿ s expected payo⁄ from choosing ￿ at date 1 is
UB(￿;￿; e q) =
Z
[v(e q;!;￿) ￿ e p] + (1 ￿ ￿)S dF(!) ￿ ￿
=
Z
[v(e q;!;￿) ￿ e p] + (1 ￿ ￿)[￿(q
￿(:);!;￿;￿) ￿ ￿(e q;!;￿;￿)]dF(!) ￿ ￿ (3)
The seller chooses non cooperatively his investment ￿ to maximize US(￿;￿; e q). The equilibrium






￿(:);!;￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)c￿(e q;!;￿)dF(!) ￿ 1 = 0 (4)
3The buyer also chooses non cooperatively her investment ￿ to maximize UB(￿;￿; e q). The equi-






￿(:);!;￿) + ￿v￿(e q;!;￿)dF(!) ￿ 1 = 0 (5)
Since the investments are chosen simultaneously, given equation (2), ￿￿ is the best reply to ￿
￿ if








￿)dF(!) = 1 (6)
Similarly, given equation (3), ￿








￿)dF(!) = 1 (7)
Aghion et al. (1994) show that if the initial contract allocates the whole bargaining power to
the seller (￿ = 1) in the renegotiation subgame (renegotiation design), a speci￿c performance
contract with a single quantity e qB = e q can solve the system of two independent equations (4)-
(5). (see Proposition 3.1, p. 267). Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) show that the same e¢ cient
solution can be implemented without renegotiation design if the parties valuation functions satisfy
the following separability condition: v(q;!;￿) ￿ v1(￿):q + v2(q;!) + v3(!;￿) and c(q;!;￿) ￿
c1(￿):q + c2(q;!) + c3(!;￿). Indeed, with such a condition they prove that a single quantity
e q = e qS = e qB =
R
q￿(:)dF(!) can solve the system (4)-(5) (see proposition 6, p. 493).
The following proposition 1 shows that the Edlin-Reichelstein (1996)￿ s e¢ cient result is due to
the equivalence between the separability condition and a no (direct) uncertainty assumption on
the valuation functions, i.e. the valuation functions are supposed to be independent of !.
Proposition 1 The separability condition is equivalent to a no (direct) uncertainty assumption
since both generate the same solution, i.e. e qB = e qS =
R
q￿(:)dF(!):
Proof We prove this in two steps. First, we show that when parties face a (direct) uncertainty,
i.e. their valuation functions are dependent of !; the optimal quantities e qB and e qS on average
exceed the actual quantity level (q￿(:)) and therefore we cannot get the unique solution generated
by the separability condition (i). Second, we show that when parties face no (direct) uncertainty
we get the same unique solution than when the valuations functions are separable, i.e. e qB = e qS = R
q￿(:)dF(!) (ii).
(i) Suppose that parties face a (direct) uncertainty and their valuation functions are linear in q,














































is satis￿ed. As v￿(!;:) and q￿(!;:) are non-negative and increasing variables in !, this condition



























holds. Which is true for the same reasons as above. Then in a general setting e qS and e qB are no
more equal, which implies that a single quantity cannot implement the e¢ cient solution.
(ii) If parties do not face any (direct) uncertainty, i.e. v(!;q;￿) and c(!;q;￿) are independent of













which implies the equality e qB = e qS =
R
q￿(:)dF(!). ￿
Note that with renegotiation design the initial quantity e qB has to be upward biased to ensure
e¢ ciency. Indeed, if ￿ = 1 in (8), we also get e qB ￿
R
q￿(!;:)dF(!). The question is then:
why can we de￿ne a unique quantity (e q = e qB = e qS) and set this quantity at an "average" trade
level (e q =
R
q￿(:)dF(!)) under the separability condition? This can be explained as follows.
What really matter in the separable valuation functions are the ￿rst terms v1(￿):q and c1(￿):q
independent of !, and the other terms play no role in the e¢ ciency result. That is why the
separability condition is equivalent to a no (direct) uncertainty assumption.
5Suppose now that the buyer o⁄ers at date 1 a contract that speci￿es a menu of two prices p(q),
with p(q) = p1 if q > 0 and p(q) = p0 if q = 0; to be paid by the buyer to the seller when they
trade q. That is, in contrast to a speci￿c performance, no trade level like a minimum quantity
e q is speci￿ed. The menu price contract just de￿nes a trade price of p1 and a no-trade price of
p0
2. The proposition 2 below shows that the equivalence between the separability condition and
the no (direct) uncertainty assumption has a strong consequence since it implies that a simple
renegotiable menu of prices (p1;p0) can implement the e¢ cient solution.
Proposition 2 With the no (direct) uncertainty assumption, the e¢ cient solution can be achieved
with a menu of prices (p1;p0):
Proof When there is no (direct) uncertainty, the parties can either trade the e¢ cient quantity
q￿(:) or choose not to trade. The initial contract has then just to share the surplus so that
parties are willing to trade. This can be done with a menu of prices (p1 if q￿(:) is exchanged
and p0 otherwise). These prices can be renegotiated at date 2. Choose (p1;p0) such that at
date 2, q￿(!;￿;￿)v(￿) ￿ p1 < p0, i.e. the buyer would prefer no trade to the e¢ cient trade
q￿(:) if there were no renegotiation. After renegotiation, the outcome is the trade of q￿(:) at a
price e p1 which makes the buyer indi⁄erent between trade and no trade, i.e. q￿(:)v(￿) ￿ e p1 = p0.
Since the buyer￿ s ex ante utility is UB(￿;p0) = p0 ￿ ￿, he invests e¢ ciently if p￿
0 is such that
p￿
0 = ￿
￿. Now, choose p1 = p￿
1 such that at date 2 q￿(!;￿;￿)v(￿)￿p￿
1 < p￿
0. Given the subsequent
renegotiation outcome, the seller￿ s ex ante utility is US(￿;p￿









￿ ￿ ￿: That is, the seller is residual claimant at the margin
and thus will invest e¢ ciently (￿ = ￿￿). ￿
This result casts doubt on the relevance of the speci￿c performance contract when a separability
condition is satis￿ed. Indeed, since a menu of prices can implement the e¢ cient solution, there is
no need to write a speci￿c performance contract where specifying the level of trade can be costly
(Battigali and Maggi 2008).
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